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NOTES
reasons, such as the financial embarrassment of the husband, refuse to
enforce the decree as to the past-due and unpaid installments.6o Secondly,
the statute has been held to apply, retroactively, to a decree rendered
prior to the passage of the statute and in which the court did not retain
jurisdiction for any purpose. 68 There apparently was no opposition by
counsel to this proposition, however. The decision as to when the modi-
fication is effective is governed by the first aspect of the retroactive
question previously considered, that is, as of the date of the modification
order, and not as the date of application therefor. 69 Finally, a liberal
construction of this statute is expressly provided for therein,7 0 and in
these proceedings the chancellor has considerable discretion. His decision
will not ordinarily be disturbed.
71
WILLIAm J. LzmMON
THE STATUS OF THE COMMON-LAW SEAL IN FLORIDA
I. DEFINITION OF A SEAL
"Till thou can'st rail the seal off this bond
Thou but offend'st thy lungs to speak so loud."'
This quotation aptly depicts the sanctity that enshrouded a seal at
common law. To Sir Edward Coke is credited the classic definition:
"A seal is wax with an impression, because wax without an impression is
not a seal." 2 These words are said by Chancellor Kent to be supported
132 Fla. 535, 182 So. 205 (1938); see Boyer v. Andrews, 143 Fla. 462, 470, 196 So.
825, 828 (1940).
"Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 542, 182 So. 205, 208 (1938).
"Van Loon . Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 542, 182 So. 205, 208 (1938); see State
ex rel. Willard v. Harrison, 133 Fla. 169, 175, 183 So. 464, 466 (1937).
"See Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 754, 18 So.2d 902, 904 (1944).
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §65.15.
'Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So.2d 902 (1944); Vilas v. Vilas, 153
Fla. 102, 13 So.2d 807 (1943); see Gaffny v. Gaffny, 129 Fla. 172, 178, 176 So.
68, 70 (1937).
'Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I, (Shylock).
2"Sigillum est cera impressa, quia cem sine impressione non est sigillum." 3 Co.
INsT. 169. For cases referring to Coke's definition see: Lowe v. Morris, 13 Ga.
147, 152 (1853); McLaughlin v. Randall, 66 Me. 226, 227 (1877); Tasker v.
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by all of the ancient authorities. 3 Though many courts pay homage to
this definition, it has been the source of innumerable interpretations. In
the main these interpretations divide into three categories:
(1) The ancient authorities construed the definition by insisting
technically that a seal does, in legal contemplation, mean an
impression upon wax; 4 and though no jurisdiction today recog-
nizes in practice this ancient construction, courts today do
recognize it as one of the strict common-law interpretations. 5
(2) The most generally recognized common-law interpretation of a
seal is that the impression is the important thingo and that the
word "wax" is used merely as a general term to denote any
substance capable of receiving an impression, such as wax, wafer,
or some other tenacious substance. 7 Even this interpretation is
subject to break-down into two conflicting views. A few courts,
leaning toward a strict concept, hold that paper alone is not
such an adequately tenacious substance as to be capable of
receiving the impression required for a seal unless so made by
statute.8 Diametrically opposed to this view are decisions hold-
Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359, 364 (Mass. 1850); Swink v. Thompson, 31 Mo. 336, 339
(1861); Corrigan v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 52, 55 (1845); Corlies v.
Van Note, 16 N. J. L. 324, 328 (1838); Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns 239, 245 (N. Y.
1810).
'4 KENT'S Comm. 452.
'See McLaughlin v. Randall, 66 Me. 226, 227 (1877); Woodman v. York &
Cumberland R. R., 50 Me. 549 (1861); Warren v. Lynch, S Johns 239, 245 (N. Y.
1810).
'See Note 4 supra.
'Corrigan v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 52 (1845); Relph & Co. v.
Gist, 4 McCord 267 (S. C. 1827); see National Prov. Bank of England v. Jackson,
33 Ch. Div. 1, 11 (1883).
'Woodburn v. United States Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918);
Capitol Amusement Co. v. Gallagher, 268 Mass. 231, 167 N. E. 674 (1929); Gates
v. State, 13 Mo. 11 (1850); Coit v. Millikin, 1 Denio 376 (N. Y. 1846); Beardsley
v. Knight, 4 Vt. 471 (1832); see Bates v. Boston & N. Y. Cent. R. R., 10 Allen
251, 254 (Mass. 1865); Tasker v. Bartlett, S Cush. 359, 364 (Mass. 1850); State
v. Thompson, 49 Mo. 188, 189 (1872) (quoting 4 KENT's Comit. 452); Allen v.
Sullivan R. R., 32 N. H. 446, 449 (1855); Gillespie v. Brooks, 2 Redf. Surr. 349,
366 (N. Y. 1876); (quoting Webster's and Bouvier's dictionaries); Osborn v.
Kistler, 35 Ohio St. 99, 102 (1878); Cromwell v. Tate, 7 Leigh 301, 304 (Va. 1836).
"Colt v. Millikin, 1 Denio 376 (N. Y. 1846); Bank of Rochester v. Gray, 2 Hill
227 (N. Y. 1842); see Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns 239, 245 (N. Y. 1810).
2
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ing that the impression upon paper itself, without the use of any
other substance, would be sufficient.9
(3) The adherents of the third concept of a seal, while not forth-
right in insisting that a scrawl or scroll is a common-law seal,
do extend the common-law concept to regard all such scrawls or
scrolls as equivalent to an actual seal. LO Some of the juris-
dictions in this third group base their decisions on the intention
of the party executing the instrument to place the instrument
under seal."2 Other jurisdictions base their argument on the
ground that, since there was neither an act of Parliament nor
an adjudged case up to Coke's day to bind the courts,' 2 his
definition of a seal represented merely his opinion, drawn from
the practice of his time;' 3 and these courts are confident that
usage and custom, recognized by judicial decisions, have dis-
pensed with the necessity of the strict common-law requisites
urged by him, even in the absence of statutes. 14
II. NECESSITY O RECITAL
Today in many states statutes have declared that written or printed
additions to the paper are sufficient alone to constitute a seal.' 3 Florida
'Royal Bank v. Grand Junction R. R. & Depot Co., 100 Mass. 444, 97 Am. Dec.
115 (1868); Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen 381 (Mass. 1867)'; see Swink v. Thompson,
31 Mo. 336, 339 (1861); Allen v. Sullivan R. R., 32 N. H. 446, 451 (1855); Beardsley
v. Knight, 4 Vt. 471, 479 (1832); National Prov. Bank v. Jackson, 33 Ch. Div. 1, 11
(1886).
10Williams v. Greer, 12 Ga. 459 (1853); Eames v. Preston, 20 Ill. 389 (1858);
Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (Md. 1831); Thompson v. Poe, 104 Miss. 586,
61 So. 656 (1913); Swink v. Thompson, 31 Mo. 336, 339 (1861); Relph v. Gist,
4 McCord 267 (S. C. 1827); Parks v. Duke, 2 McCord 380 (S. C. 1823); Whiteley v.
Davis, I Swan 332 (Tenn. 1851); Jones v. Logwood, 1 Wash. 42 (Va. 1791).
"'Williams v. Greer, 12 Ga. 459 (1853); Whiteley v. Davis, 1 Swan 332 (Tenn.
1851).
2Lowe v. Morris, 13 Ga. 147 (1853); Jones v. Logwood, 1 Wash. 42 (Va. 1791).
"3Lowe v. Morris, 13 Ga. 147 (1853); Swink v. Thompson, 31 Mo. 336 (1861).
"4Eames v. Preston, 20 Ill. 389 (1858); Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (Md.
1831); Relph v. Gist, 4 McCord 267 (S. C. 1827).
"ALA. CODE, tit. 47, §32 (1940); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 40, §22 (1935); CONN.
GEsr. STAT. §5615 (1930); IDAHO CODE ANN., tit. 16, §401 (1932); Irx. REv. STAT.,
c. 29, §1 (1947); MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 4, §§9A, 9B (1932); MscH. Com. LAWS
§13313 (1929); N. J. REv. STAT. §1:1-2.1 (1937); ORE. CoM. LAWS ANN. §2-803
3
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has a statute of this type.' 6 Yet to make a scroll or scrawl seal valid,
even when a statute provides for these substitutes, some jurisdictions
require recital in the body of the instrument or in the attestation clause
that the instrument is sealed.' 7 A recital is not necessary, however, if
the seal meets the common-law definition.' s Florida does not require a
recital indicating an intention that the instrument be sealed, even when
the statutory seal is used. The word "seal" written in the scroll is
sufficient, as is the character "L.S."'9 printed or written in a scrawl or
scroll.
2 0
III. USE, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT OV A SEAL
Originally a seal was used for the purpose of identifying and dis-
tinguishing persons. A seal took the place of a signature, since a party
executing an instrument often could not write his name. 2 1 A secondary
purpose was to import deliberation to the transaction, to supply evidence
(1940); S. D. CODE §65.0201(18) (1939); UTAH REV. STAT. §104-48-3 (1933); VA.
CODE §5562 (1942) ; W. VA, CODE §29 (1943) ; Wis. STAT. §235.17 (1947). Ordinarily,
however, when the instrument is not sealed at the time of execution, a subsequent
sealing will not cure the defect. Smalley v. Vanorden, 5 N. J. L. 951 (1820) ; Merritt
v. Horne, 5 Ohio St. 307 (1855). But when a statutory substitute for seal is used,
it is immaterial that such seal is printed on the instrument before it is executed, as
the party by signing his name in front of it adopts such printed device as his seal.
Stansell v. Corley, 81 Ga. 453, 8 S. E. 868 (1889); Moats v. Moats, 72 Md. 325,
19 Atl. 965 (1890) ; Loraw v. Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 Atl. 242 (1893).
"8FLA. STAT. 1941, §§695.07, 695.08.
"Dawsey v. Kirven, 203 Ala. 446, 83 So. 338 (1919); Lee v. Adkins, Minor 187
(Ala. 1824); Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359, 140 S. E. 869 (1927);
Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 333, 86 S. E. 242 (1915); Capitol Amusement
Co. v. Gallagher, 268 Mass. 231, 167 N. E. 674 (1929); Dickens v. Miller, 12 Mo.
App. 408 (1882); Corlies v. Van Note, 16 N. J. L. 324 (1838); Bradley Salt Co.
v. Norfolk Importing & Exporting Co., 95 Va. 461, 28 S. E. 567 (1897); Cromwell
v. Tate, 7 Leigh 301 (Va. 1836). But see Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417
(Mass. 1839); Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135, 19 N. W. 650 (1884).
"8 Dickens v. Miller, 12 Mo. App. 408 (1882); Dingee v. Kearney, 2 Mo. App. 515
(1876); Taylor v. Glaser, 2 S. & R. 502 (Pa. 1816); ;ee Draper v. Capper, 1 Dyer
19a, 73 Eng. Rep. 41 (K. B. 1536).
"Stands for "Locus Sigilli,!' the place where a seal is to be affixed, or a scroll
which stands in the place of a seal. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1129 (3d ed. 1933).
"Knights of Pythias v. State Bank, 79 Fla. 471, 84 So. 528 (1920); Langley
v. Owens, 52 Fla. 302, 42 So. 457 (1906); Comerford v. Cobb, 2 Fla. 418 (1849).
"1 See Lowe v. Morris, 13 Ga. 147, 152 (1853); Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. 613,
4
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that the instrument was the act of the party, and to add to the execution
of the instrument a solemnity designed to enlarge its effect.2 2 To a large
extent a seal is no longer necessary in order to effect these results. 2 3
Today no private individual is distinguished by a seal or supposed to be
so distinguished. 2 4  The signature-perhaps accompanied by an attesta-
tion-serves that important purpose. 2 5  Even the evidence of delibera-
tion is of little weight, since the scratch of a pen has become equivalent to
the impression of a seal on wax or wafer.2 6 For practical purposes a seal
today has but two effects-to provide for a longer period of limitation
before an action on the instrument will be barred, 2 7 and to authenticate
and make the instrument a specialty.28
IV. STATUTE Or LIMITATIONS
One advantage rendered by the seal is statutory, and consequently
well settled. 20 The Florida statute provides that an action upon a
sealed instrument is not barred until the expiration of twenty years,
while an action on an instrument not under seal is barred after the
lapse of five years. The reason for this distinction is rooted in the
common-law requirement 3 o that certain types of instruments-notably
bonds and instruments transferring interests in land-be executed under
seal. Now that Florida no longer requires that instruments conveying
an interest in land be under seal, 3 ' the presence or absence of a seal has
become a poor basis on which to rest the applicable period of limitation.
A more realistic and workable statute would determine the appropriate
615 (Pa. 1813); Cromwell v. Tate, 7 Leigh 301, 304 (Va. 1836).
"See Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns 239, 245 (N. Y. 1810); Cooper v. Rankin, 5
Binn. 613, 615 (Pa. 1813).
"Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Divine, 97 Conn. 193, 116 AtI. 239 (1922),
quoting 1 Swr's DIGEST 174 (1822).
"'See Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. 613, 615 (Pa. 1813).
"See Lowe v. Morris, 13 Ga. 147, 153 (1853); McDIII v. McDill, 1 Dall. 63, 64
(Pa. 1782).
"See Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. 613, 615 (Pa. 1813).
"
1 FLA. STAT. 1941, §95.11(1), (3) (Supp. 1947).
"'Caruthers v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 150 Fla. 467, 7 So.2d 841 (1942); Bacon
v. Green, 36 Fla. 325, 18 So. 870 (1895); Jordan v. Sayre, 24 Fla. 1, 3 So. 329
(1888); Comerford v. Cobb, 2 Fla. 418 (1849).
"F.A. STAT. 1941, §95.11(1), (3) (Supp. 1947).
"See McCabe v. Hunter, 7 Mo. 355, 357 (1842).
$'*A. STAT. 1941, §689.01.
5
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period of limitation by the nature of the transaction which an instrument
embodies.
V. SPECIALTIES: THE PROBLEM OF CONSIDERATION
Centuries before the development of the law of informal contracts
and its appendant doctrine of consideration, a seal was required to give
authenticity and operative effect to certain written instruments. 3 2  If
the seal was present, the instrument was valid; if not, the instrument was
of no effect. No question of consideration was raised, because it had
not yet occurred to the early jurists that a promise, to be binding, should
be supported by consideration running from the promisee. 3 3 Even after
the action of assumpsit became established in English law as a remedy
for the breach of informal contracts, the action of covenant remained
the proper form in which to declare on a sealed instrument. 3 4 And for
a time the question of consideration continued to be unavailable to a
defendant in an action upon a sealed instrument.
3 5
Equitable Relief and Defenses. To relieve the harshness of this
practice, the court of chancery from an early date refused, with a few
exceptions, 3 6 to order specific performance of a mere voluntary agree-
ment that was under seal but unsupported by actual consideration;
3 7
but the common-law courts were slow to allow attacks upon the dignity
of the seal.
In some states statutes permit equitable defenses in the courts of
21 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §109 (Rev. ed. 1936), citing Bellewe 111 (1385).
3
Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 Ill. 469, 82 N. E. 645 (1907); Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 191 Mass. 211, 77 N. E. 758 (1906) ; Krell v. Cogman, 154 Mass. 454, 28
N. E. 578 (1891); McMillan v. Ames, 33 Minn. 257, 22 N. W. 612 (1885); Wester
v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 24 S. E. 9 (1896).
4
HAI.SBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 52, 53 (2d ed. 1931); also see Hazen v. Cobb,
96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853 (1928); Hooker v. Gallagher, 6 Fla. 351 (1855).
"Willard v. Tayloc, 8 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 501 (1870); Harrell v. Watson, 63
N. C. 454 (1869).
"
0
Enumerated by Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13 ILL L. REv. 667, 668 (1919).
"TRude v. Levy, 43 Col. 482, 96 Pac. 560 (1908); Black v. Cord, 2 H. & G. 100
(Md. 1827) ; Lamprey v. Lamprey, 29 Minn. 151, 12 N. W. 514 (1882); Vasser v.
Vasser, 23 Miss. 378 (1852) ; Bosley v. Bosley, 85 Mo. App. 424 (1900) ; Short v.
Price, 17 Tex. 397 (1856). "Actual consideration" should in this connection be
distinguished from "good consideration." The latter, which is based on love and
affection resulting from relationship by blood or affinity, is alone sufficient in equity.
6
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law.3 8 Following to a logical conclusion, these courts have held, there-
fore, that when a defendant is sued upon a sealed instrument he may
plead consideration as a defense in a court of law, as he formerly could
have done in a court of equity.3 9 Florida, by statute, allows equitable
pleas4o which present some matter of defense that would be a good
ground for relief in a court of equity but that is not available at law. 41
Following this trend of thought, there seems no logical reason why Florida
should not allow an equitable plea on the question of consideration in
a law court as a defense against a sealed instrument.
Use of the Term "Imports Consideration." A significant statute in
the law of informal instruments was a Statute of Victoria which by
legislative fiat gave to certain unsealed instruments, such as informal
bonds and promissory notes, the same effect as specialties for purposes
of pleading and evidence. 42 This statute gave to the instruments
embraced the benefit of a presumption of adequate consideration, but
that presumption was regarded as rebuttable and subject to attack by
special plea showing want of consideration. The courts soon began to
use the phrase "imports consideration" in connection with instruments
under seal-the importation in the case of a specialty being provided
by seal rather than by statute. 43 The use of this expression would have
seemed anomalous to the early courts, which had not regarded consider-
ation as necessary to support a sealed instrument, and the continued use
of the statement that "a seal imports consideration" has created a real
question as to the precise effect of a seal in modem law.
There are very few Florida cases which deal with the effect of a
seal upon consideration.4 4 No Florida case has been found stating that
sOmo Gm. CODE A om. §11315 (Page, 1938); GA. Civ. CODE §5049 (1895).
"Lacey v. Hutchinson, 5 Ga. App. 865, 64 S. E. 105 (1909); Judy v. Louderman,
48 Ohio St. 562, 29 N. E. 181 (1891). A sealed promise to make a gift for no con-
sideration whatever is binding. Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578 (1891).
Thus, if the parties did not intend any consideration, its absence does not constitute
an equitable defense at law. When, however, though the instrument is under seal,
a valuable consideration was intended and there has been a failure thereof, the
equitable defense arises.
0FrA. STAT. 1941, §§52.07, 52.08.
'"Bacon v. Green, 36 Fla. 325, 18 So. 870 (1895); Spratt v. Price, 18 Fla. 289
(1881).
"145 & 46 Vict., c. 61 (1882).
131 WiLL Io N, CONTRACTS §109 (Rev. ed. 1936).
"Wise v. Wise, 134 Fla. 553, 556, 184 So. 91 (1938); Bennett v. Senn, 106 Fla.
7
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a seal makes consideration unnecessary. The cases state, rather, that
the seal "imports consideration." 4 5  In all of these cases, with the
exception of a gift case, 4 6 the court, after holding that a seal imports
consideration, refers to the fact that valuable consideration sufficient
to sustain the obligation without the seal was actually present in the
transaction.
47
In two Florida cases the court expressly states that a seal gives an
instrument the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of consideration. 48
One case concerns a mortgage under seal.49 In holding that such sealed
mortgage raises a rebuttable presumption of consideration, the court cited
mortgage law5 o and did not mention the common-law rule that consider-
ation was unnecessary on a sealed instrument. The second case held that
in an action of debt on a sealed instrument the assumed existence of
consideration might be attacked if the defendant supported his plea by
an affidavit. 5 ' In its reasoning the court relied on a Florida court rule
of practice5 2 identical to an old English rule.5 3 In construing this rule
of practice the Florida court relied on two English cases. 5 4 On examina-
tion of these cases it will be found that the actions were not on sealed
446, 144 So. 840 (1932); Union Bank v. Call, 5 Fla. 409 (1854); Horn v. Gartman,
1 Fla. 63 (1846).
"Wise v. Wise, 134 Fla. 553, 556, 184 So. 91 (1938); Union Bank v. Call, S Fla.
409 (1854); Horn v. Gartman, 1 Fla. 63 (1846).
"Horn v. Gartman, 1 Fla. 63 (1846). The court says that, since a sealed deed
is a substitute for delivery, this transaction was good by way of a gift, and thus
there seems to be no objection to want of consideration.
"Wise v. Wise, 134 Fla. 553, 184 So. 91 (1938). The court held that a deed
being under seal imports consideration at law. The court further stated, however,
that consideration in fact was recited in the deed. In Union Bank v. Call, 5 Fla. 409
(1854), a release under seal was held good without full consideration. The court
then asked, however, what prevented the consideration for the release from operating
as a consideration for the whole. There was no evidence that the defendant could
pay more, and it might have been to the interest of the bank to accept what It
did, even if this were one third or only one half of the indebtedness, in preference
to resorting to legal proceedings.
"Bennett v. Senn, 106 Fla. 446, 144 So. 840 (1932); Ahren v. Willis, 6 Fla. 359
(1855).
"Bennett v. Senn, 106 Fla. 446, 144 So. 840 (1932).
"WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoRFCLOStiRE 150 (4th ed. 1927).
'1 Ahren v. Willis, 6 Fla. 359 (1855).
"Common Law Court Rules, Rule No. 28.
"Rule 1, c. 2, Hilary Term 4 Will. 4.
"Stoughton v. Kilmorey, 2 C. M. & R. 72, 150 Eng. Rep. 31 (Ex. 1835); Easton
8
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instruments on that type of non-specialty-bill of exchange and promis-
sory note-which by a Statute of Victoria was given the benefit of a
rebuttable presumption of consideration. 55
Thus the effect of a seal, as concerns consideration in Florida, is
still questionable, since the Supreme Court of Florida has not crystalized
in an opinion its precise meaning of the use of the term "imports consider-
ation," and in two cases has noticeably failed to comment on the strict
common-law effect of a seal upon consideration.
Failure of Consideration. Years ago courts began to recognize a
distinction between want of consideration and failure of consideration.
At the present time there is no doubt that the distinction would everywhere
be recognized. 5 6 Most sealed promises, like unsealed promises, are not
intended to be given gratuitously but in exchange for consideration, and
a sealed instrument that purports to bargain for consideration may be
attacked by a special plea when there is a failure of the consideration
on which the obligation was based.5 7 The practical effect of this rule
is to place instruments under seal on a parity with those informal instru-
ments for which a statutory presumption of consideration is provided,
so far as concerns the defense of failure of consideration.
The Florida Supreme Court has not voiced a clear-cut distinction
between want of consideration and failure of consideration. It is logical
to assume, however, that when an agreement is based on the exchange
of consideration and there is failure of that consideration, such failure
is a defense even though the contract be under seal. To hold otherwise
defeats the obvious intention of the contracting parties, namely, that the
obligation is based upon the stipulated consideration and not upon the
sealing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The seal is subject to varying rules in other jurisdictions. In some
states the distinction between a sealed and unsealed instrument has been
v. Prachett, 1 C. M. & R. 798, 149 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ex. 1835).
1145 & 46 Vict., c. 61 (1882).
"Albertson v. Halloway, 16 Ga. 377 (1854); Piper v. Queeney, 282 Pa. 135, 127
At. 474 (1925) ; Koster v. Welch, 57 S. C. 95, 35 S. E. 435 (1900).
'"1 WnuzSTox, CoNTAcs §109 (Rev. ed. 1936), citing Wilson v. Stevens, 105
N. J. Eq. 377, 148 At]. 392 (1929).
9
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altogether abolished. 5 8 In others the seal creates a rebuttable presump-
tion of consideration.5 9 Through the years there has been a gradual
breakdown in the common-law status of the seal and a feeling that the
old concept of the seal has no place in our modern society.6 0 The
language of the Supreme Court of Florida certainly suggests that a lax
attitude toward the common-law seal has developed, and that there is
a growing tendency to follow the trend of those jurisdictions that refuse
to bestow upon a sealed instrument the full sanctity which it enjoyed in
early common law. This trend, in turn, points to the need for legislation
to relieve the courts from the burden of paying lip-service to the common-
law rules in all instances while seeking to find a method of contracting
that will meet the demands of our present society in normal business
transactions..
On the other hand, while it is true that certain attributes of the seal
at common law fit awkwardly into our society today, to abolish it in
its entirety is undesirable. Whether the status of a seal in Florida be
clarified by statutory legislation or by judicial decision, a method should
be retained by which a voluntary promise without consideration may be
rendered binding if the parties so wish.
R. THoMAs NELSON, JR.
58IND. STAT. §2-1601 (Burns, 1933); Mn N. STAT. §358.01 (1945); MISS. CODE
ANN. §260 (1942); NEB. REV. STAT. §76-212 (1943); N. M. STAT. §75-105 (1941);
Omio GEN. CODE ANN. §32 (Page, 1946); OKLA.. STAT., tit. 15, §139 (1941); W. VA.
CODE §3557 (1943); WYo. CoMP. STAT. §66-215 (1945).
59ALA. CODE, tit. 7, §232 (1940); MICH. CoMp. LAWS §14200 (1929); N. 3. REv.
STAT. §2:98-5 (1937); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §2-804 (1940); WIS. STAT. §328.27
(1947).
"See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §219 (Rev. ed. 1936), in which the belief is stated
that it is unfortunate that no method such as the common-law seal furnished is left
by which a confessedly voluntary promise may be binding. To fill the gap made
in the law of those states abolishing the common-law effect of a seal in making the
obligation enforceable without consideration, Williston sets out the Uniform Written
Obligations Act. But see 21 Ill L. Rev. 185 (1926) for a criticism of the Uniform
Written Obligations Act.
10
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